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INTRODUCTION
Police escort Jane to the emergency room and report that she shows signs
of mania and suicidal ideation. The hospital admits her for emergency care
at 7:40 p.m. Four hours later, at around 11:30 p.m., a doctor determines that
Jane is a danger to herself. The doctor recommends immediate, involuntary
commitment at the state psychiatric hospital.
Jane prepares for her transfer, but a nurse tells her she cannot leave yet.
The psychiatric hospital reports that no beds are available, and no other
psychiatric facilities in the state have openings.
Jane waits through the night, barely sleeping because of the bright lights
and noises all around her. She receives minimal care from the well-meaning
nurses and doctors, who do their best to stabilize her condition but must also
tend to numerous other patients with pressing needs. Jane’s condition
worsens, and she becomes increasingly agitated.
Five days pass. Jane becomes frustrated and lashes out, overwhelmed
with anxiety. Security staff and paramedics are called fourteen times to
restrain her. The hospital spends $26,000 on personnel for Jane’s 130 hours
of care.
Finally, a bed opens up at the state psychiatric hospital, and Jane is
transported there for specialized treatment. Her involuntary commitment has
begun.1
New Hampshire law provides for the involuntary commitment of a
patient such as Jane when she is a danger to herself or others as a result of
mental illness.2 The patient has a right to treatment under N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §§ 135-C:1, et seq.3 Specifically, the patient should receive “adequate
and humane treatment” pursuant to an “individual service plan” and “in the
least restrictive environment necessary.”4 However, appropriate facilities
often are not available for patients waiting in emergency rooms,5 and patients
1

Based on a true story of a patient in New Hampshire. See Shawn V. LaFrance & Daniel J.
Walsh, HELP: People Seeking Mental Health Care in New Hampshire 8, FOUND. FOR
HEALTHY
COMMUNITIES
(Feb.
2013),
http://www.healthynh.com/images/PDFfiles/publications/a%20HELP%20Rpt%20FINAL%20
02%2022%20%2013.pdf.
2
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:27, 34 (2014).
3
See id. §§ 135-C:1, et seq.
4
Id. §§ 135-C:13, 135-C:57.
5
See, e.g., Casey McDermott, Panelists Discuss Mental Health In New Hampshire, CONCORD
MONITOR (Sep. 24, 2014), http://www.concordmonitor.com/news/13687361-95/panelistsdiscuss-mental-health-in-new-hampshire (reporting on remarks by an emergency room doctor
that patients are “left waiting days at the hospital before they can get to treatment elsewhere”);
Sarah Palermo, Mentally Ill Patients Face Spartan Conditions, Long Delays In New
Hampshire,
CONCORD
MONITOR
(Mar.
10,
2013),
http://www.concordmonitor.com/home/4741184-95/hospital-state-mental-pod; Sarah Palermo,

2015

PSYCHIATRIC BOARDING IN NEW HAMPSHIRE

199

can become trapped for hours or even days.6 This phenomenon is called
“psychiatric boarding.”7
New Hampshire is not alone in providing a statutory right to treatment,
and the problem of psychiatric boarding is common in other states.8 While
enforcement of statutory rights to treatment often is elusive,9 the Washington
Supreme Court delivered a landmark ruling on psychiatric boarding in
August 2014, finding that it violated the state laws protecting involuntarily
committed patients.10
Could the Washington court’s rationale lead to similar conclusions in
other states? Looking to New Hampshire as an example, the state statutes for
commitment and treatment rights are analogous to Washington’s,11 and this
suggests that the Washington ruling could prove a valuable precedent for
barring psychiatric boarding in other states.
This Note will compare Washington’s involuntary commitment law to
New Hampshire’s, argue that psychiatric boarding is illegal under New
Hampshire law, and propose solutions for complying with the statute,
including the continued implementation of community-based services. If

Record Number Of People Waited Last Week In NH Emergency Departments For Mental
Health
Services,
CONCORD
MONITOR
(Aug.
25,
2013),
http://www.concordmonitor.com/news/8188121-95/record-number-of-people-waited-lastweek-in-nh-emergency-departments-for-mental-health (reporting that forty-seven people
suffering from mental health crises waited for beds at the State Hospital on one night).
6
McDermott, supra note 5.
7
David Bender et al., A Literature Review: Psychiatric Boarding, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS. (Oct. 29, 2008), http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/2008/psybdlr.htm (defining
“boarding” as “the practice in which admitted patients are held in hallways or other emergency
department (ED) areas until inpatient beds become available”).
8
See Bender, supra note 7 (noting that in 2008, eighty percent of emergency department
medical directors reported that boarding occurred in their facilities); JOHN PARRY, CIVIL
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE, AND TESTIMONY 509 (2010) (writing that “[m]ost states
have provisions in their laws guaranteeing an array of rights to those committed to facilities,”
and these commonly include “a right to treatment or habilitation”).
9
See 2 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW § 3A-3.1 (LEXIS Law Publ’g, 2d ed.
1998) (discussing the right to treatment and asking if “such a broad order [can] ever,
realistically, be implemented?”).
10
Det. of D.W. v. Dep’t of Soc. and Health Servs., 332 P.3d 423, 428 (Wash. 2014).
11
Compare N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:57 (“Persons receiving mental health services shall
have the right to . . . [a]n individual service plan [and] . . . [t]reatment in the least restrictive
environment necessary to achieve the purposes of the treatment.”) with WASH. REV. CODE §
71.05.360(2) (“Each person involuntarily detained or committed pursuant to this chapter shall
have the right to adequate care and individualized treatment.”).

200 UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 14, No. 1	
  
New Hampshire implemented its statutory scheme as written, it would satisfy
patients’ rights to treatment.
I. INVOLUNTARY EMERGENCY ADMISSIONS IN NEW HAMPSHIRE
Forty-seven states, including New Hampshire, have statutory provisions
for emergency involuntary commitment of individuals exhibiting
dangerousness as a result of mental illness.12 In New Hampshire, a petitioner
for involuntary commitment must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the individual poses a potentially serious likelihood of danger to self or
others.13 The petitioner must point to specific acts, such as a drug
overdose,14 physical attacks on family members,15 or a credible threat to kill
one’s spouse.16
Involuntary commitment denies a person the individual liberty and
autonomy at the core of the American political tradition, and it therefore
requires significant procedural safeguards.17 The Supreme Court stated in
Addington v. Texas that “civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”18
New Hampshire law reflects this constitutional concern and sets forth a
detailed procedure for involuntary commitment.19
A. The Legal Basis for Involuntary Commitment
1. New
Commitment

12

Hampshire

Statutes

Providing

for

Involuntary

PARRY, supra note 8 at 471; 1 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW § 2A-1
(LEXIS Law Publ’g, 2d ed. 1998).
13
In re B.T., 891 A.2d 1193, 1198 (N.H. 2006).
14
Id. at 262 (stating that respondent’s overdose “was undoubtedly a specific act that had the
potential to cause her serious bodily injury”).
15
State v. Lavoie, 924 A.2d 370, 373 (N.H. 2007) (finding dangerousness where the defendant
spat in his mother’s face, tried to strangle her, and physically fought his father).
16
See In re O'Neil, 992 A.2d 672, 675 (N.H. 2010) (describing dangerous behavior where the
respondent suggested to his insurance agent that he would violate a protective order keeping
him from his wife and that “someone [might end] up hurt or dead”).
17
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979); see BRUCE J. WINICK, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE
MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT 201–02; BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT 17 (2005).
18
Addington, 441 U.S. at 425.
19
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:27–33; see In re Richard A., 771 A.2d 572, 576 (N.H. 2001)
(analyzing the “significant statutory safeguards” that “exist to minimize the risk of erroneous
deprivation of liberty due to civil commitment”); Opinion of the Justices, 122 N.H. 199, 204
(1982) (interpreting the New Hampshire Constitution as requiring stricter due process
standards than the federal minimum for purposes of involuntary commitment).
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New Hampshire law provides that a person is “eligible for involuntary
emergency admission if he is in such mental condition as a result of mental
illness to pose a likelihood of danger to himself or others.”20 This basic
standard—danger to self or others as a result of mental illness—parallels
most other state statutes providing for civil commitment.21 It derives from
the state’s parens patriae power and police power.22
The statute applies to those experiencing “mental illness,”23 though states
often define this term vaguely.24 New Hampshire, for instance, defines
“mental illness” as “a substantial impairment of emotional processes, or of
the ability to exercise conscious control of one’s actions, or of the ability to
perceive reality or to reason, when the impairment is manifested by instances
of extremely abnormal behavior or extremely faulty perceptions.”25
Mental illness alone, without an additional finding of dangerousness, “is
insufficient to involuntarily admit any person into the mental health services
system.”26 Under New Hampshire statutory law, a person is a “danger to
himself” when, within the previous forty days, he has attempted, inflicted, or
threatened to inflict “serious bodily injury on himself,” and “there is a
likelihood the act or attempted act will recur if admission is not ordered.”27
20

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:27.
Robert M. Levy & Leonard S. Rubenstein, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
DISABILITIES 29 (1996); PARRY, supra note 8, at 471; PERLIN, supra note 12 § 2A-1.
22
BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT 42 (2005) (“The avoidance of danger to self
constitutes an expression of the state’s parens patriae power to protect the individual’s well
being. The avoidance of danger to others constitutes an expression of the state’s police power
interest in protecting the community from harm.”); see O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,
573–74 (1975) (noting that most state laws for involuntary commitment are generally
advanced “to prevent injury to the public, to ensure [the committed person’s] own survival or
safety, or to alleviate or cure his illness”); Levy & Rubenstein, supra note 21, at 15
(“[I]nvoluntary institutionalization creates a conflict between the individual’s right to liberty
and government’s twin powers to shield vulnerable citizens from harm and to protect society
from danger.”).
23
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 135-C:27.
24
WINICK, supra note 22, at 48.
25
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:2.
26
Id. § 135-C:1; In re B.T., 891 A.2d 1193, 1199 (N.H. 2006) (interpreting the stated policy of
New Hampshire’s statutory scheme for involuntary commitment to mean that that state cannot
“order an involuntary admission based solely on the existence of a mental illness”).
27
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:27(I)(a)–(b); In re B.T., 891 A.2d. at 1198. The statute
provides other possible criteria for finding a danger to self. Id. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135C:27(I)(c) (“The person’s behavior demonstrates that he so lacks the capacity to care for his
own welfare that there is a likelihood of death, serious bodily injury, or serious debilitation if
admission is not ordered.”); id. at § 135-C:27(I)(d) (providing an alternative test for finding
21
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A person is a “danger to others” when, within the previous forty days, he has
“inflicted, attempted to inflict, or threatened to inflict serious bodily harm on
another.”28
2. Case Law Governing Involuntary Commitment
The involuntary commitment statute comports with the state’s legitimate
interests in “providing care to its citizens who are unable because of
emotional disorders to care for themselves” and “protect[ing] the community
from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill.”29 However,
the state’s power to achieve these interests is tempered by the individual’s
liberty interests.30 In particular, “[f]reedom from bodily restraint” is “at the
core of the liberty protected by the due process clause from arbitrary
governmental action.”31 The risk of harm to an involuntarily committed
individual is “significantly greater than any possible harm to the state.”32
Accordingly, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has interpreted the
involuntary commitment statute to contain safeguards for individual rights.33
“The liberty of the patient is to be curtailed only to the extent necessary to
protect her and the public,” and a standard of clear and convincing evidence
applies at civil commitment proceedings to protect the personal interests at
stake.34
Dangerousness is a legal concept rather than a medical one; “it is the
judge who makes the decision and not the psychiatrist.”35 A petition for civil
commitment must “allege specific acts or action demonstrating
dangerousness,” and while a psychiatrist’s report is “a crucial piece of

that a person is a “danger to himself,” requiring, among conditions, that he is severely
mentally disabled, has been involuntarily committed in the past, has no guardian, refuses
treatment, and an approved psychiatrist for a mental health program determines, based on the
patient’s history, that “there is a substantial probability that the person’s refusal to accept
necessary treatment will lead to death, serious bodily injury, or serious debilitation if
admission is not ordered”).
28
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:27(II).
29
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
30
See Levy & Rubenstein, supra note 21, at 15 (contending that the “massive curtailment of
liberty” that occurs during involuntary commitment can infringe upon “the right to liberty, to
freedom of association, to travel, to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, and to
bodily autonomy”).
31
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).
32
Addington, 441 U.S. at 427.
33
In re Richard A., 771 A.2d 572, 577–76 (N.H. 2001).
34
In re B.T., 891 A.2d 1193, 1198 (N.H. 2006); Dolcino v. Clifford, 321 A.2d 577, 578 (N.H.
1974).
35
State v. Hudson, 409 A.2d 1349, 1351 (N.H. 1979).
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evidence,” it is not dispositive at a commitment hearing.36 On their own,
signs of “agitation, delusion, disorganized thinking, and paranoia” do not
satisfy the specific acts requirement for proving a danger to self or others.37
The purpose of commitment is treatment, not punishment.38 Once a
patient is rehabilitated, the state no longer may confine him.39 The United
States Supreme Court held in O’Connor v. Donaldson that under the due
process clause, a patient must be released if he no longer is both mentally ill
and a danger to himself or others.40
Although most states provide by statute the right to treatment for those
involuntarily committed, there is “virtually no case law on the question of a
state constitutional right to treatment.”41
B. Procedure for Involuntary Commitment
The procedure for involuntary commitment in New Hampshire often
begins at an emergency room when a “petitioner,” such as a police officer or
relative, brings a person to the hospital after witnessing him exhibit signs of
mental illness and dangerousness.42 A police officer may place the person
under protective custody for up to six hours while awaiting examination.43
The petitioner completes a written petition for examination and
commitment.44 Once the petitioner completes his form, the patient begins
what could be a long wait.45 A qualifying physician or advanced practice
registered nurse (“APRN”) must examine the patient within three days and, if
warranted, complete a certificate recommending commitment.46
If a qualifying physician or APRN completes a certificate recommending
commitment, a law enforcement official must “take custody of the person”
36

In re Fasi, 567 A.2d 178, 181 (N.H. 1989).
In re B.T., 891 A.2d at 1199.
38
In re Richard A., 771 A.2d at 578.
39
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:33(I).
40
422 U.S. 563 at 575–76 (1975).
41
PERLIN, supra note 9, at § 3A-13.
42
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:28(I) (defining “petitioner” as “any individual, including a
physician or APRN completing a certificate, who has requested that a physician or APRN
conduct or who has conducted an examination for purposes of involuntary emergency
admission”).
43
Id. § 135-C:28(III).
44
Id. § 135-C:28(I).
45
See McDermott, supra note 5.
46
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:28(I).
37
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and “immediately deliver him” to a “designated receiving facility.”47 The
“designated receiving facility” is a “treatment facility” approved by the state
“to accept for care, custody, and treatment persons involuntarily admitted to
the state mental health services system.”48 About half of New Hampshire’s
inpatient beds for committed patients are located in the state capital,
Concord.49 Many patients must travel there from rural areas, and if they
resist, police may transport them in handcuffs.50
Upon arrival, the facility must notify the patient of a right to legal
counsel, including a right to appointed counsel if the patient is indigent.51
Within three days of an “involuntary emergency admission” at the receiving
facility, the patient is entitled to a hearing in district court to determine if
probable cause existed for admission.52
If the court finds that probable cause exists for the emergency admission,
the admission must not exceed ten days unless a subsequent petition is
filed.53 The statute does not, however, make provisions for the protection of
patients who first waited several days in the emergency room because no
receiving facilities were available.54 The plain language of the statute omits
any mention of boarding in emergency rooms because this scenario is outside
what the legislature intended to occur.
Under the statutory scheme, increased deprivation of liberty corresponds
to an increase in procedure.55 After a patient spends ten days at a receiving
facility under emergency admission, a petitioner can file in probate court for
longer involuntary admission.56 The order for admission could last up to five
years.57 However, this admission may occur only after an additional
psychiatric examination and a hearing at which the person has a right to
counsel and a right to cross-examine the psychiatrist who filed the relevant
report.58
47

Id. § 135-C:29
Id. § 135-C:2
49
Rick Jurgens, Valley Regional Proposes New Mental Health Facility, VALLEY NEWS (Feb.
1, 2015), http://www.vnews.com/news/15434146-95/valley-regional-proposes-new-mentalhealth-facility.
50
Id.
51
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:30(I), (II).
52
The three-day period does not include Sundays and holidays. Id. §§ 135-C:30(V), 135C:31(I).
53
Id. § 135-C:32.
54
See id. (contemplating a maximum of ten days of involuntary emergency admission without
any reference to the possibility of additional detainment in an emergency room); McDermott,
supra note 5.
55
See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 135-C:32, 35, 36, 40.
56
Id. § 135-C:32.
57
Id. § 135-C:46.
58
Id. §§ 135-C:40, 43
48
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II. THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT
A. Legal Basis for the Right to Treatment
The state has a duty to provide services and care to those who are
institutionalized.59 Some patient rights are easily defined; for instance, the
rights to safe conditions, confidentiality of medical records, and freedom
from unreasonable seclusion.60 However, the meaning and scope of an
enforceable “right to treatment” varies by jurisdiction, as the state
“necessarily has considerable discretion in determining the nature and scope
of its responsibilities.”61
Under the federal Constitution, substantive due process implies some
level of treatment, since, at a minimum, the state must show that “the nature
and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for
which the individual is committed.”62 When a person is a danger to himself,
the purpose of commitment is to ameliorate the danger he poses to himself.63
Likewise, the purpose of commitment when a person is a danger to others is
not merely confinement; the purpose is to reduce the risk of danger through
medical treatment so that he may leave.64 Involuntary commitment that fails
its purpose by confining a patient but not providing adequate treatment
would arguably violate due process requirements by arbitrarily depriving a
person of liberty.65
In Youngberg v. Romeo, the Court recognized a limited right to treatment
and training for those involuntarily committed to a state institution, though
59

Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) (finding it uncontroverted that “[w]hen a
person is institutionalized [and] wholly dependent on the State . . . a duty to provide certain
services and care does exist”).
60
E.g. id. at 315–16, 318 (asserting a “right to security” and “freedom from restraint” inherent
in substantive due process for those involuntarily committed); WINICK, supra note 22, at 197.
61
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 317; Levy & Rubenstein, supra note 21, at 215; WINICK, supra note
22, at 197.
62
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972); WINICK, supra note 22, at 199.
63
See WINICK, supra note 22, at 199 (stating that “[t]he purpose of civil commitment based on
the government’s parens patriae power is to promote the best interests of individuals who, by
reason of their mental illness,” are not well-situated “to make decisions on their own behalf.”).
64
Id. at 200.
65
Id. at 200–01; see THE EVOLUTION OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW 45 (Richard J. Bonnie and
Lynda Frost eds., 2001) (describing a right to services that arguably arises “whenever the state
deprives a person of liberty or otherwise takes custodial control”).
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only as necessary “to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint.”66
Beyond this constitutional right to treatment, many state legislatures have
enacted broader and better-defined rights to treatment.67 The consensus,
however, is that the right to treatment generally entails a humane
environment, adequate staffing, and individualized treatment plans.68
New Hampshire law provides such a right.69 After defining criteria for
involuntary commitment, the relevant statute lists the rights of those
receiving mental health services.70 These include the right to an individual
service plan and “[t]reatment in the least restrictive environment necessary to
achieve the purposes of the treatment.”71 The patient “has a right to adequate
and humane treatment provided in accordance with generally accepted
clinical and professional standards.”72 The New Hampshire Supreme Court
has held that the statutory right to treatment conveys more than a general
goal by the legislature; it protects the “civil rights of the mentally disabled
who are confined in State institutions.”73
In addition to protecting a patient’s liberty interests, the involuntary
commitment statute also implies a concern for the patient’s ability to function
at his probable cause hearing.74 In the forty-eight hours before the hearing,
the hospital cannot administer medication that would adversely affect the
patient’s judgment or “limit his ability to prepare for the hearing.”75
New Hampshire courts may enforce the state’s statutory right to
treatment.76 Since violation of the right requires a remedy, the state
impliedly has waived sovereign immunity in claims alleging violation of the
right to treatment.77
B. The Related Right to Community-Based Services

66

457 U.S. at 319; PARRY, supra note 8, at 452; see PERLIN, supra note 9, § 3A-9.8
(discussing the limited reach of the right to treatment articulated thus far by the Supreme
Court).
67
PARRY, supra note 8, at 452; WINICK, supra note 22, at 201; see PERLIN, supra note 9, §
3A-14.2 (writing that states responded to the lack of a clearer Supreme Court mandate for
treatment by implementing their own statutory rights to treatment).
68
PARRY, supra note 8, at 471.
69
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:57.
70
Id. § 135-C:55–60.
71
Id. § 135-C:57.
72
Id. § 135-C:13.
73
Chasse v. Banas, 399 A.2d 608, 610 (N.H. 1979).
74
See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:31(IV).
75
Id.
76
Chasse, 399 A.2d at 610.
77
Id.
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When the state commits a person involuntarily, it must provide treatment
in the least restrictive setting possible. In Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring,78
the Supreme Court held that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) prohibits the unjustified segregation of individuals with disabilities,
and it set forth certain requirements for states to provide community-based
services rather than relying exclusively on more restrictive forms of
treatment like institutionalization.79
New Hampshire faced a complaint under this interpretation of the ADA
in Amanda D. v. Hassan (2012). 80 The state was sued by a class of plaintiffs
who had serious mental illnesses and who were unnecessarily
institutionalized, or at serious risk of unnecessary institutionalization, in
state-run facilities.81 In 2014, New Hampshire entered a class action
settlement agreement in which it agreed to provide a more effective mental
health system with significantly enhanced and expanded community-based
services.82 The promised services included mobile crisis teams, Assertive
Community Treatment teams,83 supported housing, employment services,
and family and peer support.84 Thus, under both federal ADA mandates and
New Hampshire’s involuntary commitment statute, New Hampshire patients
are entitled to these less restrictive forms of treatment—such as communitybased services—whenever possible.85
III. PSYCHIATRIC BOARDING IN NEW HAMPSHIRE
A. Definition of “Psychiatric Boarding”
78

527 U.S. 581 (1999).
Id. at 607; PARRY, supra note 8, at 453–54; see also 90 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1 (2014).
80
Amanda D. v. Hassan, Civ. No. 1:12-cv-53-SM (D.N.H. 2012).
81
Id.
82
Class Action Settlement Agreement, Amanda D. v. Hassan, Civ. No. 1:12-cv-53-SM
(D.N.H. 2012), http://www.drcnh.org/mentalhealthcrisis.html [hereinafter Settlement].
83
Assertive Community Treatment teams are designed to provide “comprehensive, intensive,
and flexible treatment, services, and supports to individuals with mental illness, when and
where they need them.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation of the New Hampshire Mental
Health System Pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act 21–22 (Apr. 7, 2011),
http://www.ada.gov/olmstead/documents/new_hampshire_findings.pdf.
They “combine
treatment, rehabilitation, and support services from professionals in a variety of disciplines,
including but not limited to, psychiatry, nursing, substance abuse, and vocational
rehabilitation.” Id. at 22.
84
Id.
85
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:57.
79
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“Psychiatric boarding” occurs when a patient is held in an emergency
room because no inpatient beds are available for treatment.86 Boarding
persists until inpatient beds become available or, if permitted, the patient
leaves without treatment, and this wait can last twenty-four hours or even
days.87
Although at common law doctors did not have a duty to treat potential
patients, federal law requires hospitals to provide treatment in emergency
rooms, regardless of ability to pay, pursuant to the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Labor Act, among other measures.88 Thus, an emergency
room must attempt to treat and stabilize a person brought to the facility for
evaluation and commitment.89 But the emergency room can only accomplish
so much, and once a doctor or APRN determine that the patient should go to
a facility specializing in psychiatric care, such facilities often are
unavailable.90 The patient is then “boarded” in the emergency room.91
B. Prevalence of Psychiatric Boarding
A 2008 national study found that seventy-nine percent of emergency
departments reported the occurrence of psychiatric boarding at their
facilities, and ninety percent of those facilities boarded patients every week.92
According to another study, psychiatric patients are almost five times more
likely to be boarded than non-psychiatric patients.93
Nationally, a patient subjected to psychiatric boarding will wait an
average of 2.8 hours longer for appropriate care than a non-psychiatric
patient; however, the figure is much higher in the Northeast.94 In New
Hampshire, a 2013 report found that over half of all patients recommended
86

Bender et al., supra note 7; Lois A. Weithorn, Envisioning Second-Order Change in
America's Responses to Troubled and Troublesome Youth, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1369
(2005) (defining “boarding” as “the phenomenon of persons with mental disorders remaining
in hospital emergency rooms while waiting for mental health services to become available”);
ACEP Psychiatric And Substance Abuse Survey 2008, AM. COLL. OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS
(2008),
http://newsroom.acep.org/download/ACEP+Psychiatric+and+Substance+Abuse+Survey++April+2008.pdf.
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Bender et al., supra note 7.
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David Chorney, A Mental Health System in Crisis and Innovative Laws to Assuage the
Problem, 10 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 215, 223 (2014).
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Mary A. Blegen et al., Psychiatric Boarding Incidence, Duration, and Associated Factors in
United States Emergency Departments, 41 J. EMERGENCY NURSING 57, 62 (Jan. 2015).
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See id. at 62–63.
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Id. at 63; Chorney, supra note 88, at 216–18.
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ACEP Psychiatric and Substance Abuse Survey 2008, supra note 86.
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Id. at 63.
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for involuntary emergency admission for mental health treatment waited for
twenty-four hours or longer.95 For those who waited over twenty-four hours,
the average wait was two-and-a-half days, and the longest wait was seven
days.96 A subsequent New Hampshire study found that an average of
twenty-one adults and five children were waiting for involuntary emergency
admission each day during a four-month period.97
C. Detrimental Effects of Psychiatric Boarding
Patients waiting in the emergency room do not receive needed therapies
to improve their mental conditions.98 Instead, they are subjected to the
typical commotion of an emergency room: “flashing lights, buzzing alarms
and staff rushing from room to room.”99 What little care they do receive is
substandard compared to the specialized treatment they would receive at a
designated receiving facility, and the delays can exacerbate dangerous
conditions.100 Psychiatric boarding is associated with emergency room
overcrowding, which correlates with increased mortality, morbidity, longer
inpatient stays, and decreased patient satisfaction.101
Boarding also is expensive for all parties involved.102 In 2012, a South
Carolina emergency room boarded a psychiatric patient for 38 days, at an
added cost of $56,392 for the hospital.103 Massachusetts implemented a
95

Shawn V. LaFrance & Daniel J. Walsh, supra note 1.
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Behavioral Health Task Force in 2012, and it found that psychiatric boarding
drove increased health care costs for the commonwealth government.104
Moreover, while the hospital boards psychiatric patients, emergency room
staff and resources are diverted from non-psychiatric patients who require
emergency medical services.105
D. Psychiatric Boarding and Substantive Due Process
The amount of time that involuntarily committed patients may be held
before a probable cause hearing is a highly litigated issue.106 Psychiatric
boarding is a closely related issue because it lengthens the overall time of
involuntary confinement.
New Hampshire’s statutory scheme does not explicitly mention the
added time a patient might wait in an emergency room before a probable
cause hearing.107 When a petitioner brings a person to the emergency room
for involuntary commitment, and the person is then subjected to several days
of psychiatric boarding, his detainment is arguably a violation of his due
process rights.108
To bring such a claim under § 1983, however, a plaintiff would need to
identify a state actor.109 The hurdle is high.110 In 2005, the First Circuit
reviewed a case in which an involuntarily committed patient sued private
healthcare providers under § 1983.111 The court applied three tests—the state
compulsion test, the nexus/joint action test, and the public function test—and
under each analysis, the court held that the private healthcare providers were
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Chorney, supra note 88, at 231.
Katz, supra note 102, at 25.
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107
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ANN. § 135-C:31.
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See, e.g., Brief of Respondents at 8–9, In re the Detention of D.W., 120 Wash.App. 1043
(2014) (No. 45111-5-II), 2014 WL 4657352, at *7 (arguing that psychiatric boarding violates
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42 U.S.C. § 1983; Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 922, 937 (1982) (requiring
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the State”); Estades-Negroni v. CPC Hosp. San Juan Capestrano, 412 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2005)
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color of state law deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right”).
110
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not state actors.112 It therefore affirmed dismissal of the patient’s § 1983
claim.113
The New Hampshire District Court likewise raised the state-actor hurdle
in Trimble v. Androscoggin Valley Hospital, Inc.,114 where the court rejected
a due process claim brought on behalf of an involuntarily committed patient
who killed himself in the hospital.115 The court declined to follow116 its prior
decision in Kay v. Benson,117 where the plaintiff brought a due process claim
against a physician who signed a certificate for his involuntary
commitment.118 The court in Kay denied the physician’s summary judgment
motion because the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to show that the
physician “was clothed with state authority so substantial in nature as to
render his actions virtually identical to actions traditionally taken by a
state.”119 However, the court in Trimble found that in the intervening fifteen
years, other courts “reached emphatically different conclusions” than in
Kay.120 The clear trend was that “[a] private physician or private hospital
should not become a state actor for” § 1983 liability when acting under the
state’s involuntary commitment law.121 In light of this trend, the district
court declined to follow Kay.122
Though claimants subjected to psychiatric boarding might still find ways
to surmount the state-actor hurdle,123 this Note will instead focus on the
statutory right to treatment as precluding psychiatric boarding.
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IV. PSYCHIATRIC BOARDING AS A STATUTORY VIOLATION OF THE
RIGHT TO TREATMENT
While a § 1983 claim would face the hurdles described above, a state
statutory claim—grounded in a patient’s right to treatment—could provide
stronger footing for a challenge to psychiatric boarding.124
Could a statutory right to treatment bar psychiatric boarding? In 2014,
the Washington Supreme Court found such a prohibition.125
In a
groundbreaking opinion, the court held that psychiatric boarding violated a
patient’s statutory right to treatment when used merely to avoid
overcrowding at certified facilities.126
The following analysis shows similarities between New Hampshire’s
statutory framework for the commitment and treatment of mentally ill
persons and the Washington statutes that invalidated psychiatric boarding.
An analogous interpretation of New Hampshire’s statutory right to treatment
militates against the continued use of psychiatric boarding.
A. Washington State’s Mental Health Statute Is Similar to New
Hampshire’s
Washington State’s statutory scheme for involuntary commitment
closely resembles the statutory scheme in New Hampshire.
Both states declare treatment as a purpose of the laws.127 In Washington,
commitment serves to “provide prompt evaluation and timely and
appropriate treatment of persons with serious mental disorders,” as well as
“continuity of care” for such persons.128 In New Hampshire, the state’s
purposes include providing “adequate and humane care” to those with severe
mental disability; coordinating “a comprehensive, effective, and efficient
system of services for persons with mental illness”; and reducing “the

and “not-for-profit agencies that have contracted with the [state health department] to provide
publicly funded mental health services to individuals and families”).
124
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:57 (2015); see Det. of D.W. v. Dep’t of Soc. and Health
Servs., 332 P.3d 423, 428 (Wash. 2014) (holding that the state’s right-to-treatment law did not
permit psychiatric boarding as a means to avoid overcrowding).
125
See Anne Scheck, Psychiatric Boarding Banned in Washington State: Now What?
EMERGENCY MED, NEWS 20, 21 (Nov. 2014) (discussing the groundbreaking ruling in
Washington State and its implications for healthcare providers and state health departments).
126
Det. of D.W., 332 P.3d at 428.
127
Compare N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:1 (1995) with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
71.05.010 (West 1998).
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WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.010(2), (4) (West 1995).
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occurrence, severity and duration of mental, emotional, and behavioral
disabilities.”129
Rehabilitation is a chief concern. Washington endeavors to prevent
indefinite commitment, while New Hampshire calls for care to be “[d]irected
toward eliminating the need for services and promoting the person’s
independence.”130
Another goal of the Washington framework is to “encourage, whenever
appropriate, that services be provided within the community.”131 Similarly,
New Hampshire strives to provide care “[w]ithin each person’s own
community” and in a manner that is “[l]east restrictive of the person’s
freedom of movement and ability to function normally in society.”132
The two states’ criteria for involuntary commitment closely mirror each
other. A person with mental illness is eligible for involuntary emergency
admission if he is a danger to himself or others.133 The state cannot confine
the person just anywhere; Washington requires treatment in an “evaluation
and treatment facility,” while New Hampshire requires treatment in an
analogous “receiving facility.”134
Both states require a qualified medical professional to examine the
patient upon his arrival at a psychiatric facility, and the professional must
complete a “certificate” or “petition” showing that the patient met the
statutory criteria for involuntary commitment.135 The patient is then entitled
to a probable cause hearing within three days.136
After the hearing, a patient in Washington may be detained for up to
fourteen additional days of involuntary, intensive treatment, and in order to
129

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:1(I), (II) (1995).
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1998).
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detain a person after fourteen days, further judicial process is required.137 A
patient in New Hampshire may be detained for ten days before further
commitment proceedings are required.138
The states impose an additional limit on the time of detainment. In
Washington, the facility may release a patient if he “no longer presents a
likelihood of serious harm.”139 In New Hampshire, the facility “shall
discharge the person” if he no longer satisfies the statutory criteria.140
Finally, the states give substance to their stated policy goals by
enumerating rights to treatment. Washington law provides: “Each person
involuntarily detained or committed pursuant to this chapter shall have the
right to adequate care and individualized treatment.”141 New Hampshire law
provides: “Each client has a right to adequate and humane treatment provided
in accordance with generally accepted clinical and professional standards.”142
New Hampshire patients also have a right to an “individual service plan” and
“[t]reatment in the least restrictive environment necessary to achieve the
purposes of the treatment.”143
B. Violation of the Statutory Right to Treatment in Washington State
The Washington Supreme Court interpreted the state’s commitment and
treatment statutes to bar psychiatric boarding in Detention of D.W.144 The
case arose from a common problem: a county lacked space in its certified
facilities for involuntarily detained patients, so instead, the county held them
in emergency rooms.145 The county argued that a regulation sanctioned
psychiatric boarding.146 It construed this regulation to allow “single bed
certification” at uncertified facilities (emergency rooms) when no certified
facilities were available.147
Ten patients challenged the legality of this practice.148 The county had
held the patients in emergency rooms or acute care clinics using single-bed
certification.149 The patients waited for three to ten days,150 yet when no
137
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rooms opened up, the county petitioned to hold the patients longer.151 The
patients moved to dismiss the petitions because they were not held in
certified facilities, and thus did not receive adequate treatment while
confined.152
One of the county’s mental health supervisors testified at an evidentiary
hearing that the county obtained single-bed certification simply by faxing a
form to the state hospital, which, according to the supervisor, almost always
approved the certifications without asking questions.153 He also testified that
patients held under such circumstances received “less care than they would if
they were in an evaluation and treatment center,” and the emergency room
was “actually a more restrictive environment.”154
The commissioner dismissed the county’s petitions, and after the county
appealed, the patients’ claims eventually reached the Washington Supreme
Court.155 Two hospital systems intervened on the county’s side, along with
the state Department of Social and Health Services.156 Appellants argued
that the state’s involuntary commitment law and its implementing regulation
permitted single-bed certification as a solution to overcrowding at certified
facilities.157
The court strictly construed the statute because it impacted liberty
interests.158 In reaching its decision, the court relied on Washington’s
statutory provision for “the right to adequate care and individualized
treatment,” as well as the mandate that patients “be held in certified
evaluation and treatment facilities.”159 Individuals have a right to treatment
under Ninth Circuit precedent, and lack of funds cannot justify the state’s
failure to treat the patient.160
The court noted that Washington’s statutory definition of “certified
evaluation and treatment facilities” did not include emergency rooms or
acute care centers, and such facilities could be used only if they were
150
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specifically designated as “evaluation and treatment centers” by the
Department of Social and Health Services.161 The parties in Detention of
D.W. did not contend that emergency rooms were so designated.162
The court ruled that the patients were entitled to adequate treatment at
certified facilities, and the only permissible reason for not using a certified
facility would be to further the overarching goal of the statute: providing
adequate treatment.163 If, for instance, a doctor cited a medical reason for
keeping a patient in the emergency room—“such as dialysis or chemical
dependency treatment”—then single-bed certification might be
appropriate.164 The regulation permitting single-bed certification only went
this far.165
Washington did not use psychiatric boarding to further treatment; it used
psychiatric boarding to cope with lack of resources.166 Therefore, the court
held that the state violated the patients’ rights when it relied on psychiatric
boarding to avoid overcrowding at certified facilities.167
C. Could a Similar Case Arise in New Hampshire?
Although plaintiffs have generally had mixed results in bringing claims
under state right-to-treatment laws,168 Detention of D.W. could encourage
similar claims in other states. Under the Washington ruling, a patient’s rights
do not change simply because a certified facility is unavailable. A New
Hampshire court could likely reach the same result using a similar rationale.
1. The Basis for a Similar Case in New Hampshire
As described above, New Hampshire and Washington have similar
statutory frameworks for involuntary commitment.169 Both states declare
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treatment as their purpose;170 both enumerate a right to treatment;171 both
contemplate time limits for confinement and mandate judicial process to
safeguard individual rights;172 and both require treatment in certified
facilities.173
Just like the respondents in Detention of D.W., involuntarily committed
patients in New Hampshire are entitled to treatment at a certified facility and
in the least restrictive environment necessary.174 The court in Detention of
D.W. strictly construed the statutory requirement that patients receive
treatment in certified “evaluation and treatment facilities,” and New
Hampshire likewise requires treatment in a designated “receiving facility.”175
Just as the Washington court held that emergency rooms did not meet the
statutory criteria, similarly, New Hampshire could reach the same result by
finding that emergency rooms are not designated receiving facilities, and are
not used to provide better medical treatment, but rather to avoid
overcrowding.
The court discussed regulations at length in Detention of D.W., since the
regulations had expressly permitted single-bed certification.176
New
Hampshire regulations address psychiatric boarding only indirectly.177 They
mandate that a receiving facility accept a patient sent to that facility pursuant
to the involuntary commitment law, “unless there are no beds available at the
time of admission.”178 What should happen if no beds are available at any of
the receiving facilities? The regulations do not say.
Appellants in Detention of D.W. argued that the Washington regulations
provided an answer: lacking beds at certified facilities, the state could board
patients in emergency rooms using “single bed certification.”179 Yet the
170
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court rejected appellants’ interpretation of the regulation, holding that
overcrowding was no excuse for psychiatric boarding.180 New Hampshire
does not have an equivalent “single bed certification” regulation, and even if
it did, a court would likely interpret it as inconsistent with the statutory
requirement that a patient immediately be transferred to a certified receiving
facility.181
New Hampshire regulations also implicate psychiatric boarding when
discussing the purposes of receiving facilities. One purpose of a receiving
facility is to admit involuntarily committed patients “beginning with initial
custody and continuing through the day following the probable cause
hearing.”182 This language mandates that patients should go to designated
receiving facilities as soon as possible from the time of “initial custody.” For
involuntarily committed patients waiting in emergency rooms, the time of
initial custody has already begun.
Finally, the New Hampshire statute for involuntary commitment states
that “[u]pon completion” of a certificate for emergency admission, “any law
enforcement officer shall . . . take custody of the person to be admitted and
immediately deliver him to the receiving facility identified in the
certificate.”183 The command to “immediately deliver” the patient to the
facility gives no leeway for psychiatric boarding.
2. Possible Ambiguities in New Hampshire’s Statutory Right to
Treatment
While the Washington right to treatment is analogous to New
Hampshire’s, claimants in a first impression case will encounter some
differences and ambiguities in the laws. These variations in language should
not lead to a different holding.
When interpreting statutes, New Hampshire courts “examine the
language found in the statute, and where possible, [they] ascribe the plain
and ordinary meanings to words used.”184 The court will “interpret
legislative intent from the statute as written and will neither consider what
the legislature might have said nor add language it did not see fit to
include.”185
“When the language used in the statute is clear and
180
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unambiguous,” the court will not modify its meaning by judicial
construction.186
The legislature’s policy objectives are relevant to interpretation of
ambiguous provisions. The court will “interpret a statute in the context of
the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation.”187 Its goal is to apply
statutes “in light of the legislature’s intent in enacting them” and “in light of
the policy sought to be advanced by the entire statutory scheme.”188
The language in New Hampshire’s statutory right to treatment contains
ambiguities, discussed infra in this section, and a reviewing court will thus
look beyond the language to the legislature’s policy goals in determining
legislative intent. Here, the legislature’s stated purpose in its mental health
system laws is to:
(a) Establish, maintain, and coordinate a comprehensive,
effective, and efficient system of services for persons with
mental illness.
(b) Reduce the occurrence, severity and duration of
mental, emotional, and behavioral disabilities.
(c) Prevent mentally
themselves or others.189

ill

persons

from

harming

The legislature’s stated policy is to provide “adequate and humane care”
that is:
(a) Within each person’s own community.
(b) Least restrictive of the person’s freedom of
movement and ability to function normally in society while
being appropriate to the person’s individual capacity.
(c) Directed toward eliminating the need for services and
promoting the person’s independence.190
186
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Thus, the stated purpose and policy weigh toward broad application of
treatment rights when interpreting the statutes for involuntary emergency
admission.
Under § 135-C:57, individuals have a right to “[t]reatment in the least
restrictive environment necessary to achieve the purposes of the
treatment.”191 § 135-C:55 restricts the application of this right, along with
other patients’ rights, “to those persons who have been found eligible for
services under RSA 135-C:13 and to those persons who have been admitted
to receiving facilities.”192 The right to treatment, as enunciated in § 135C:57, would thus apply only to: (1) those eligible for services under § 135C:13, and (2) those admitted to receiving facilities. These two groups raise
questions of interpretation.
First, when has a person “been found eligible for services under RSA
135-C:13,” such that the statutory right to treatment in § 135-C:57 applies? §
135-C:13 prohibits discrimination in provision of services, stating: “Every
severely mentally disabled person shall be eligible for admission to the state
mental health services system, and no such person shall be denied services
because of race, color or religion, sex, or inability to pay.”193 This section
appears to address those seeking services voluntarily more than it does those
forced to receive services involuntarily.
Nonetheless, § 135-C:13 could arguably encompass those held for
involuntary, emergency commitment. It states that individuals found to be
“severely mentally disabled” are eligible for state mental health services. A
separate provision defines “severely mentally disabled” to mean “having a
mental illness which is either so acute or of such duration as to cause a
substantial impairment of a person’s ability to care for himself or to function
normally in society.”194 This definition would likely cover those who, as a
result of mental illness, are a danger to themselves or others. Considered
alongside the broader definition, legislative intent to provide treatment, as
well as the constitutional requirement to provide treatment when liberty is
deprived for that purpose, § 135-C:13 is properly read to include patients
who are in custody and boarded in emergency rooms.
The second group of patients within the scope of § 135-C:55 are those
“admitted to receiving facilities.”195 Under § 135-C:26, receiving facilities
are for “the care, custody, and treatment of persons subject to involuntary
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admissions.”196 Thus, the second question of interpretation: When has a
patient been “admitted” to receiving facilities?
If “admitted” means arrival at the receiving facility or assignment to a
bed, then a patient waiting in the emergency room has not yet been admitted.
On the other hand, if “admitted” means that a patient is in custody and
waiting for transport to a particular receiving facility, then a patient subjected
to psychiatric boarding is “admitted”—just to an overcrowded facility. This
reading is more consistent with the statutory scheme, which contemplates
that a person may be held up to six hours while a petition is filed, and once
the petition and medical certificate are complete, the person must
“immediately” be transferred to a designated receiving facility.197
§ 135-C:28 may provide guidance for interpreting the term “admitted.”
It states that “involuntary emergency admission . . . may be ordered upon the
certificate of a physician or APRN.”198 The physician “shall identify in the
certificate the facility in the state mental health services system to which the
person shall be admitted.”199 In choosing a facility, he must identify the
option “which least restrict[s] the client’s freedom of movement, ability to
make decisions, and participation in his community while achieving the
purposes of habilitation and treatment.”200 This section suggests that the
patient is “admitted” to a receiving facility upon completion of the certificate
by an emergency room doctor, with the overarching “purposes of habilitation
and treatment” guiding the process throughout the patient’s detention.
Extension of the right to treatment to boarded patients is further
supported by § 135-C:31, which states that a receiving facility may transfer a
patient to another receiving facility only if the second “receiving facility can
better provide the degree of security and treatment required for the
person.”201 Again, this provision indicates that the patient’s treatment is the
foremost concern while he is in custody.
In sum, the overall statutory scheme supports a finding that patients
subjected to psychiatric boarding are entitled to treatment in the least
restrictive environment necessary. In light of the legislative intent to provide
treatment to those with serious mental illness, and the clear mandate to
provide treatment to those whose liberty is curtailed involuntarily, courts
196
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should resolve the statutory ambiguities in a way that supports treatment of
individuals subjected to psychiatric boarding.
V. EFFECTIVE RESPONSE: IMPLEMENT THE STATUTE AS WRITTEN AND
EXPAND COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES
The ruling in Detention of D.W. forced Washington officials to consider
treatment options for boarded patients.202 Such patients previously had been
in legal limbo, but the court clarified their rights. The chair of the state house
appropriations committee responded to the ruling by commenting, “It’s
always been inhumane not to provide treatment; now it’s clearly illegal.”203
Health officials struggled with how to respond. An official at the
department of social and health services worried that as a result of the ruling,
more mentally ill patients could end up on the streets without receiving the
care they needed.204 However, hospitals cannot simply throw patients out
because of overcrowding; they must comply with federal requirements for
safe discharges.205 Dr. Alex Rosenau, President of American College of
Emergency Physicians (“ACEP”), said there was “no doubt” the ruling
would “help with crowding,” but he wondered: “what is step two?”206
One way or another, the court required Washington to implement the
statute as written. Officials were compelled to make difficult budgetary
decisions and ensure sufficient resources at certified facilities.207
New Hampshire too should make the difficult budgetary decisions now
and implement its statutes as written. The state’s detailed statutory
procedures for commitment derive from the serious liberty interests at stake
and mandate that New Hampshire must provide “[t]reatment in the least
restrictive environment” consistent with both legislative intent and critical
constitutional considerations.208

202

See Andy Mannix & Lynn Thompson, Ruling that bans ‘psychiatric boarding’ has health
officials
scrambling,
SEATTLE
TIMES
(Aug.
8,
2014),
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2024266358_psychiatricboarding1xml.html (reporting
that health officials were “scrambling” after the ruling, and one official began planning for
increased community-based services and inpatient beds).
203
Id.
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
Anne Scheck, Psychiatric Boarding Banned in Washington State: Now What? EMERGENCY
MED. NEWS 20, 20–21 (Nov. 2014).
207
See id. (noting that Washington State committed $30 million to “improv[ing] access to
mental health services”).
208
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:57 (1986).

2015

PSYCHIATRIC BOARDING IN NEW HAMPSHIRE

223

A. Community-Based Services Are the Best Starting Point
New Hampshire should continue expanding community-based services
for those with mental illness. This will relieve pressure on the state’s
inpatient facilities and reduce the number of patients requiring emergency
care. Community mental health services are more cost- and outcomeeffective than attempting to add beds at long-term facilities.209
The state already has a good start toward the implementation of a full,
robust system of community-based services. In New Hampshire’s classaction settlement in Amanda D., the state agreed to significantly expand and
enhance its community-based services, including mobile crisis teams,
supported housing, Assertive Community Treatment teams,210 and
employment services.211
Telehealth programs also could reduce boarding. The mobile crisis
services implemented through Amanda D. focus on more populous areas of
New Hampshire.212 For underserved and rural areas, telehealth could provide
a partial solution.213 The terms “telehealth” or “telemedicine” broadly
describe “the use of medical information exchanged from one site to another
via electronic communications to improve the patient’s health status.”214
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B. Long-Term Institutionalization Would Not Remedy the Problem
At first glance, increasing the number of beds at long-term facilities may
seem like a quick fix for psychiatric boarding, and some state officials have
called for this solution.215 However, this response would not serve patients
well, since long-term institutionalization is not as effective as communitybased services,216 and if the state over-relies on long-term facilities to provide
care, it will expose itself to the same liability that led to its settlement in
Amanda D.217 Instead, the state should focus on enhancing community-based
services.
1. Long-Term Institutionalization Is Less Effective and Exposes
the State to Liability
The trend over the past several decades has been to rely less on longterm institutionalization because it is not as effective as community-based
services.218 Institutionalization is an extreme measure that entails social costs
and substantial risks to those committed.219 Furthermore, spending scarce
resources on facility-based treatment may leave people without necessary
services in the community, resulting in individuals cycling in and out of
hospitals without creating long-term stability within the community.
If for no other reason, New Hampshire should avoid increased reliance
on long-term institutionalization because the same reliance exposed the state
to liability under Amanda D.220 The state agreed to provide a greater balance
of community-based services in its settlement agreement.221 Over-reliance
215
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on institutionalization violates the ADA and violates the doctrine of the least
restrictive alternative.222
2. Long-Term Institutionalization Is Uneconomical
From a state budgetary perspective, adding beds at long-term facilities is
too costly compared to more economical solutions like increased communitybased services.223 Like many states, New Hampshire faced a budget shortfall
for fiscal year 2015 with no apparent resources to fund additional mental
health services.224 Community-based services can cost a fraction of
institutionalization and may qualify for Medicaid reimbursement.225 In 2010,
the average cost of treating a person at New Hampshire’s primary long-term
facility was $287,000 per year, compared to $44,000 per year to treat a
person in the community.226
C. Treatment Must Precede the Probable Cause Hearing
The trigger for the three-day countdown to a probable cause hearing
currently begins with the patient’s arrival at a designated receiving facility.227
The state could arguably cure procedural due process concerns by starting the
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countdown earlier with the filing of the involuntary emergency admission
petition, such that patients boarded in the emergency room would receive a
hearing sooner. However, this response does not necessarily help such
individuals because patients do not receive adequate treatment while in the
emergency room, and as a result, they are less likely to perform well at a
hearing.228 Moreover, this option does not cure the state’s potential liability
for violation of the right to treatment, since patients could leave without
having received their promised “adequate and humane treatment.”229
VI. CONCLUSION
Psychiatric boarding violates patients’ right to treatment by confining
them in highly restrictive environments that do not provide adequate care and
that do not meet the statutory criteria for receiving facilities. Washington’s
statutory framework for involuntary commitment and its corresponding
ruling in Detention of D.W. suggest that involuntarily committed patients
could succeed in a similar claim in New Hampshire. The state should
implement the statute as written and continue to expand community-based
services, thus ensuring that no patients fall between the cracks.
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